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Abstract
■ When explaining the reasons for othersʼ behavior, perceivers
often overemphasize underlying dispositions and personality
traits over the power of the situation, a tendency known as the
fundamental attribution error. One possibility is that this bias re-
sults from the spontaneous processing of othersʼ mental states,
such as their momentary feelings or more enduring personality
characteristics. Here, we use fMRI to test this hypothesis. Partici-
pants read a series of stories that described a targetʼsa m b i g u o u s
behavior in response to a specific social situation and later judged
whether that act was attributable to the targetʼsi n t e r n a ld i s p o s i -
tions or to external situational factors. Neural regions consistently
associated with mental state inference—especially, the medial
pFC—strongly predicted whether participants later made disposi-
tional attributions. These results suggest that the spontaneous
engagement of mentalizing may underlie the biased tendency to
attribute behavior to dispositional over situational forces. ■
INTRODUCTION
Human beings place a significant premium on understand-
ing why other humansdothe things they do. Isthe woman
s i t t i n gn e x tt om ea tt h ec o f f e es h o pt a l k i n gs ol o u d l y
because she is a shrill and high-strung person or simply
because sheʼs overcaffeinated? In the absence of additional
information about this person (e.g., seeing what sheʼs
like before imbibing three espressos), observers might
be expected to remain agnostic about whether her be-
havior reflects stable personality characteristics or more
transient features of the situation. However, decades of
social psychological research have revealed that perceivers
frequently gravitate strongly toward dispositional infer-
ences (“sheʼs a jumpy one!”) and inexplicably discount
situational influences (the effects of caffeine on behavior;
e.g., Jones & Harris, 1967; Kelley, 1967). This psychological
bias has been termed the “fundamental attribution error”
(Ross, 1977), for the notion that we tend toward making
attributions that are fundamental to the person rather
than to the situation in which the person finds himself.
Influential work reveals that the fundamental attribution
error occurs spontaneously when people meet others,
without the need for conscious intervention (Winter,
Uleman, & Cunniff, 1985). The task for psychologists
now is to explain not only the conditions that give rise to
the fundamental attribution error (Kelley, 1967) but also
the cognitive processes responsible for its use.
As i z e a b l el i t e r a t u r ei ns o c ial cognition reveals that
when we aim to understand other peopleʼs intentions,
we mentalize about them—that is, we seek to represent
the contents of othersʼ minds (Frith, Morton, & Leslie,
1991). This feature of human social cognition has also
been termed “adopting the intentional stance” (Dennett,
1987), implying the notion that understanding othersʼ
actions is best achieved by assuming those actions are
guided by intentions. A large number of neuroimaging
studies implicate a role for a well-characterized set of brain
regions in mentalizing, including medial pFC (MPFC), pos-
terior cingulate cortex, TPJ, and STS (Van Overwalle, 2009;
Amodio & Frith, 2006; Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005).
These regions, among others, have been collectively re-
ferred to as “the social brain” (Adolphs, 2003) for their
seeming specialization for social knowledge representa-
tion. Activation in this network has been observed when
we consider othersʼ minds both explicitly (Moran, Lee, &
Gabrieli, 2011; Mitchell, Heatherton, & Macrae, 2002)
and spontaneously (Ma, Vandekerckhove, Van Overwalle,
Seurinck, & Fias, 2010; Moran, Heatherton, & Kelley,
2009) and across a wide range of experimental situations
including imputing mind to animated shapes (Martin &
Weisberg, 2003), playing cooperative games (McCabe,
Houser, Ryan, Smith, & Trouard, 2001), and making moral
judgments (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, &
Cohen, 2001). Thus, activation in the social brain regions
appears to be associated strongly with our ability to adopt
the intentional stance. Recent experimental efforts suggest
that the core mentalizing regions (MPFC and TPJ) are acti-
vated more than other social brain regions when we infer
traits spontaneously (i.e., when task demands encourage
different kinds of processing), but that more peripheral
regions (such as posterior cingulate cortex and STS) are
also brought on-line when we intentionally infer traits
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hinted that MPFC in particular is activated in experimental
conditions that encourage participants to make disposi-
tional attributions about othersʼ behaviors (Harris, Todorov,
& Fiske, 2005), although these activations were not tied
to the actual dispositional inferences made.
Here, we test the hypothesis that spontaneous men-
talizing may underlie the fundamental attribution error
by examining the activation of neural regions involved in
mentalizing when participants make attributions about
peopleʼs behaviors. We tested our hypothesis by having
participants undergo fMRI while making attributions about
hypothetical behaviors that could have either situational
or dispositional causes. We predicted that activation
in regions involved in mentalizing would differentiate
behaviors about which participants made dispositional
attributions versus behaviors they deemed to have a situa-
tional cause. Given recent efforts to differentiate the con-
tributions made by different social brain regions (Van
Overwalle, 2009), we sought to determine which regions
within this network might be differentially involved in
making dispositional attributions.
METHODS
Participants and Procedure
Participantswere16right-handedvolunteers(9men;mean
age = 23.0 years, SEM = 1.3 years) with no history of
psychiatric or neurological disorders. Participants pro-
vided informed consent and were compensated in accor-
dance with the regulations of the Committee on the Use
of Human Subjects at Harvard University.
We created a set of 48 scenarios about a personʼs be-
havior that contained information describing both situa-
tional and dispositional causes for that behavior (stories
are available at wjh.harvard.edu/∼scanlab/Moran_FAE_
story_stimuli.pdf). Each scenario had a question associated
with it that asked about two possible causes for the
personʼs behavior. One answer implied a situational ex-
planation, whereas the other implied a dispositional expla-
nation. Participants had to choose one of these response
options. Our goal was to create scenarios describing ac-
tions that were equally attributable to something about
the situation or something about the person in the sce-
nario. As such, all scenarios contained mental state infor-
mation. The fundamental attribution error would thus be
revealed in answers that appealed to dispositional causes.
It is important to note that such answers are neither cor-
rect nor incorrect, as the true cause of the personʼsb e -
havior is unknown. Scenarios were initially normed by
172 on-line respondents using Amazonʼs Mechanical Turk
service (www.mTurk.com). On-line participants rated the
answers on a 7-point scale between the dispositional ex-
planation (1) and the situational explanation (7). In this
way, we could determine which scenarios created most
consensus among respondents and which did not. During
fMRI scanning, participants read the same scenarios with
the modification that they made a two-alternative forced-
choice response about whether the actorʼs behavior was
more likely attributable to something inherent to her or
his dispositions or to aspects of the situation. On-line
ratings were correlated with the proportion of situational
responses obtained during the neuroimaging experiment,
r(46) = .81, p < .001. This result demonstrated that ratings
obtained during the neuroimaging experiment were rep-
resentative of ratings for these scenarios obtained outside
the MRI scanner environment. Stories were presented for
12 sec, and answer phases were presented for 6 sec. A
variable delay (0–6 sec) was interspersed between story
and answer phases to allow decomposition of the hemo-
dynamic responses in each phase (Dale & Buckner, 1997).
We included a variable interval of 0–8 sec following each
trial. Trials were modeled as events with durations for
the presentation lengths of the story and answer phases.
We also conducted analyses where we modeled answer
phases as concluding once participants had made their
responses (M = 3.61 sec, SEM = 0.1 sec). Activations were
broadly identical from both analyses, and we report the re-
sults from the analyses modeling the entire presentation
of the answer phase.
Stories were conditionalized based on fMRI participantsʼ
responses. Specifically, we first computed a measure of
“attributional ambiguity” for each story by computing the
absolute difference between the number of situational
and dispositional attributions it attracted across the par-
ticipants from the fMRI sample. A score of zero would
represent a perfectly ambiguous story for which 50% of
participants made a dispositional attribution and 50%
made a situational attribution. A score of 100 would imply
that the story attracted the same response from all partici-
pants. We divided stories into three groups of 16 stories
each (high [M =1 7 ] ,m e d i u m[ M =4 6 ] ,a n dl o w[ M =
80] response ambiguity) and separately modeled re-
sponses for the three story types. The rationale for this
division was that we felt we were more likely to observe
the fundamental attribution error in stories that were
relatively ambiguous: If all participants gave a dispositional
(or situational) response for a given story, we can infer that
the story naturally contains information that leads more
directly to one or the other explanation. If, however, a
story attracts 50% dispositional and 50% situational re-
sponses, we can conclude that there is less trait diagnostic
information available in the story and thus that participants
who gravitate toward dispositional attributions are com-
mitting the fundamental attribution error, as there is no
consensus on the true causes of behavior.
To understand how participants viewed these stories,
we compared behavioral responses across the story set
to determine the proportions of dispositional and situa-
tional responses. Overall, participants made more situa-
tional (Mproportion = .63) than dispositional responses
(Wilcoxon signed rank test, W = 258.5, Z =3 . 2 3 ,p <
.002, r = .47). This pattern was true for the set of stories
570 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 26, Number 3that was low in response ambiguity (Mproportion situa-
tional = .72; W =2 3 ,Z =2 . 3 3 ,p <. 0 2 ,r =. 5 8 )a n dw a s
less apparent in both the medium-response (Mproportion
situational = .64; W =3 1 ,Z =1 . 9 2 ,p = .054, r =. 4 8 )
and high-response ambiguity story sets (Mproportion situa-
tional = .54; W = 31, Z = 1.65, p > .10, r = .41). Hence,
the makeup of these stories led participants to provide
situational explanations more often than dispositional ex-
planations. This is not too surprising, given that both the
story and answer phases contained information that stated
directly the situational pressures on behavior and, in the
case of the answer phases, asked participants to consider
explicitly whether the situational influence precipitated the
behavior. This experimental framing is necessarily unlike
real-life episodes that elicit the fundamental attribution
error; there, the situational forces are often obscured
or only vaguely hinted at, and we are not asked to weigh
the relative merits of situational and dispositional forces.
Thus, even when the situational forces are made explicit
because of experimental constraints, there are still signifi-
cant numbers of stories for which participants opt for the
dispositional explanation, and in the case of the high-
response ambiguity stories, this proportion was not differ-
ent from the proportion of stories that attracted situational
responses.
Imaging Acquisition and Analysis
Functional data were acquired using a gradient-echo echo-
planar pulse sequence (repetition time = 2 sec, echo
time = 35 msec, flip angle α = 90°) on a 3T Siemens Tim
Trio MRI scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany). Images
were acquired using 36 axial, interleaved slices with a
thickness of 3 mm (0.54 mm skip) and 3 × 3 mm in-plane
resolution. Functional images were preprocessed and
analyzed using SPM (Wellcome Department of Cognitive
Neurology, London, United Kingdom) and custom soft-
ware (spm8w, Kelley and Heatherton Labs, Dartmouth
College, Hanover, NH). Data were realigned within and
across runs to correct for head movement, unwarped to
correct for geometric distortions, and transformed into a
standard anatomical space (2 mm isotropic voxels) based
on the ICBM-152 brain template (Montreal Neurological
Institute). Normalized data were then spatially smoothed
(8mmFWHM)usingaGaussiankernel.Finally,usingcustom
artifact detection software (www.nitrc.org/projects/artifact_
detect), individual runs were analyzed on a participant-by-
participant basis to find outlier time points. Specifically,
we excluded volumes during which participant head
motion exceeded 0.5 mm or 1° and volumes in which
the overall signal for that time point fell more than three
standard deviations outside the mean global signal for
the entire run. The design matrix included regressors for
dispositional and situational responses across story and
answer phases for each of the sets of high-, medium-, and
low-response ambiguity stories separately (for a total of
12experimentalconditions).Thetrialsweremodeledusing
a canonical hemodynamic response function and covari-
ates of no interest (session mean and linear trend, outlier
time points excluded as above). In cases where partici-
pants did not respond, story and answer phases for those
trials were entered into “no response” conditions that were
ignored in further analyses (M =4 . 0 % ,SEM =1 . 2 % ) .A n a l -
ysis was performed individually for each participant, and
contrast images were subsequently entered into second-
level analyses treating participants as a random effect.
Two whole-brain analyses were performed. In our first
analysis, we identified brain regions that responded more
when participants made dispositional versus situational
attributions across all story types and phases (i.e., across
low-, medium- and high-ambiguity stories and across back-
ground and answer phases). This analysis allowed us to
make a general determination about the brain regions
associated with dispositional attributions (regardless of
whether there was consensus across participants about
the sources of actorsʼ behaviors in the stories). In our
second analysis, we narrowed down our stimulus set to
just those stories that were maximally ambiguous across
our group of participants. This analysis would control
for the content of the story phases, as identical scenarios
would appear in the dispositional and situational condi-
tions across participants. Because we aimed to determine
whether activation in mentalizing brain regions predict
how participants will respond, in this analysis, we also
considered brain activations in just the story segments of
each scenario. Thus, this analysis compared subsequently
dispositional stories to subsequently situational stories.
Peak coordinates in our whole-brain analyses were iden-
tified at the group level using a statistical criterion of
56 or more contiguous voxels at a voxel-wise threshold
of p < .005. A Monte Carlo simulation implemented in
MATLAB determined that these thresholds corresponded
with a corrected voxel-wise threshold of p < .05 (Slotnick,
Moo, Segal, & Hart, 2003). In the simulation, random
noise was created with the same voxel dimensions as our
preprocessed data (and smoothed with the same 8 mm
kernel), with the constraint that the proportion of falsely
active voxels was 0.005. After 1000 simulations, the prob-
ability of each cluster size was determined, and the cluster
extent that yielded p < .05 (56 voxels) was selected for
use in voxel extent thresholding.
RESULTS
Our initial whole-brain analysis collapsed across both
ambiguity and phase to compare all dispositional versus
all situational stories. This analysis allowed us to deter-
mine the brain regions involved in making dispositional
responses across ambiguous and unambiguous stories
and across story and answer phases. These brain re-
gions would be on average more active across all phases
and story kinds for dispositional versus situational re-
sponses. Brain regions showing greater activation for
dispositional > situational attributions included, from
Moran, Jolly, and Mitchell 571anterior to posterior, bilateral dorsomedial pFC (dmPFC)
and superior frontal gyrus, ACC, left anterior insula, right
inferior frontal gyrus, right posterior STS, right TPJ, and
precuneus (Figure 1A and Table 1A). No regions were
more active for situational versus dispositional attribu-
tions in the reverse contrast. The results of these analyses
imply that regions involved in orienting to othersʼ mental
states are also engaged when we attribute the causes of
someoneʼs behavior to their internal dispositions to act
in such a way.
However, this analysis did not control for the storiesʼ
content: An alternative possibility is that “dispositional”
stories simply contained more mental state information
than did “situational” stories. Because we collapsed across
both phases, a second possibility is that greater activations
in mentalizing regions during dispositional stories were
driven by participants paying attention just to the mental
state information provided in the dispositional answer
they chose during the answer phase. Greater activation
in regions responsible for representing mental state infor-
mation in either circumstance would thus be unsurprising,
because they would simply be responding to the presence
of mental state information. To control for these con-
founds, we performed a second analysis, which limited
its focus to just the set of 16 scenarios that attracted
approximately even numbers of dispositional (46%) and
situational responses (54%, recall that these proportions
were not significantly different from one another). This
analytical choice ensured that across our participants
(i.e., at the level of random effects) those scenarios ap-
pearing in the dispositional condition were the same as
those scenarios appearing in the situational condition.
Any brain responses in mentalizing regions would there-
fore not have occurred as a result of the presence of men-
tal state information alone. In addition, we restricted this
Figure 1. (A) Regions showing greater activations for all dispositional >
situational attributions, collapsed across all stories and both story and
answer phases. There was greater activation in dmPFC, superior frontal
gyrus, ACC, right inferior frontal gyrus, right middle temporal gyrus,
the precuneus, and the right TPJ. (B) Regions predicting dispositional
attributions: There was greater activation in dmPFC, superior frontal
gyrus, and the STS during subsequently situational > subsequently
dispositional stories. These regions, implicated in mentalizing, predicted
which participants would commit the fundamental attribution error
when reading about an actorʼsb e h a v i o r .
Table 1. All Scenarios: Peak Voxel and Cluster Size for
All Regions Obtained from the Contrast of Dispositional >
Situational Attributions across Both Story and Answer Phases
Anatomic Label x y z Peak t
Voxel
Extent
A. Dispositional > Situational
(r) Superior frontal gyrus 18 49 32 4.18 260
(r) dmPFC 10 47 44 3.91
6 55 42 3.69
(l) dmPFC −12 45 44 3.25
(r) Inferior frontal gyrus 42 41 40 4.62 79
(l) Superior frontal gyrus −22 33 54 3.64 109
ACC 8 27 32 3.91 91
(r) Inferior frontal gyrus 48 25 0 4.51 352
40 25 4 3.92
(l) Anterior insula −24 15 12 5.86 148
(r) STS 62 −31 −10 4.41 216
54 −35 −6 4.15
62 −21 −22 3.40
(r) TPJ 58 −49 26 4.01 160
56 −59 20 3.82
48 −51 12 3.50
Precuneus 12 −49 48 3.46 70
2 −45 46 3.29
B. Situational > Dispositional
No significant differences
572 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 26, Number 3analysis to just the story phases. Analysis was restricted to
the story phase because these activations would occur
before participants read the answer phases, and hence
they would not be attributable to the participants con-
sidering only the answer that implied a disposition and
ignoring the situational answer.
In this analysis, for each participant, the story phase
of each ambiguous story was conditionalized as a func-
tion of whether that participant subsequently attributed
the actorʼs behavior to internal dispositions or to exter-
nal situational factors. As such, this analysis identified
neural responses that predict whether a perceiver would
attribute dispositional or situational causes to an actorʼs
behavior. A whole-brain, random-effects analysis of sub-
sequently dispositional stories > subsequently situational
stories revealed greater activation in a few regions: dmPFC,
superior frontal gyrus, aCC, and posterior middle temporal
gyrus (Figure 1B and Table 2A). Each of these regions was
implicated in the initial analysis comparing all disposi-
tional versus all situational stories. Thus, it appears a sub-
set of the mentalizing network predicts which participants
will later make dispositional attributions about actorsʼ be-
haviors. To the extent that these regions have been linked
consistently to mentalizing about other minds (Amodio
& Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 1999), these results suggest
that perceivers were more likely to make a dispositional
attribution about a personʼs actions to the extent that they
spontaneously attended to the actorʼs internal mental
states. Regions that were more active for subsequently
situational stories > subsequently dispositional stories
were the left temporal pole and left amygdala (Table 2B).
DISCUSSION
We found that the activation of a particular subset of
brain regions implicated in mental state understanding—
including MPFC and posterior lateral temporal cortices—
predicted whether perceivers attributed dispositional or
situational causes to another personʼs ambiguous be-
havior. In addition, because these activations occurred
before participants read the answer phases, they could
not be attributed to the participants considering only the
answer that implied a disposition and ignoring the situa-
tional answer. In particular, MPFC has been consistently
associated with forming impressions about and repre-
senting the minds of others across multiple experimental
paradigms, such as considering othersʼ character traits
(Moran et al., 2011) and making moral judgments (Greene
et al., 2001). Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that
regions of MPFC more ventral to those observed here are
used to represent trait knowledge about others (Ma et al.,
in press). Spontaneous MPFC activation may thus reflect
the involvement of cognitive mechanisms designed to
extract trait knowledge from exemplars of behavior. As
such, these findings suggest that the human tendency to
attribute othersʼ actions to dispositional causes—the fun-
damental attribution error—may depend on the sponta-
neous activation of these regions in social situations.
Interestingly, in a powerful automated parcellation that
converged on a solution separating the brain into seven
major networks, each of these regions was implicated
as part of the same grouping—the default mode network
(Yeo et al., 2011). This fact suggests an intriguing possibi-
lity: If these regions are marked by high resting metabolic
activity and their activity is associated with dispositional
attributions about othersʼ behavior, then it may be un-
surprising that perceivers naturally default to making such
dispositional (rather than situational) attributions. One
of the major puzzles for social psychologists has been
explaining why people are so prone to committing the
fundamental attribution error, even when the situational
influences are made obvious (Gilbert & Malone, 1995).
Perhaps a lifetime of reflexively considering othersʼ mental
states and intentions creates a default strategy for under-
standing other minds through reference to their disposi-
tional characteristics, one that might require significant
cognitive effort to overcome (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull,
1988). In other words, one of the consequences of the
link between the default network and dispositional
attributions is that perceivers may default to using the in-
tentional stance when it is not useful—the fundamental
attribution error. There are at least two directly testable
predictions from this view. First, individuals with reduced
default mode network activity, such as those with autism
Table 2. Ambiguous Scenarios: Peak Voxel and Cluster Size
for All Regions Obtained from (a) the Contrast of Subsequently
Dispositional Stories > Subsequently Situational Stories and
(b) the Contrast of Subsequently Situational Stories >
Subsequently Dispositional Stories
Anatomic Label x y z Peak t
Voxel
Extent
A. Dispositional > Situational
(l) dmPFC −10 41 42 3.74 148
−6 45 42 3.41
−12 35 56 3.31
(r) dmPFC 10 41 54 4.05 67
14 31 60 3.48
Superior frontal gyrus 20 33 54 3.25
ACC −18 25 28 4.10 83
(r) Middle temporal gyrus 58 −15 −18 4.88 66
46 −21 −20 3.92
B. Situational > Dispositional
(l) Temporal pole −30 11 −22 4.69 226
−46 11 −26 4.26
(l) Amygdala −28 −1 −24 3.73
Moran, Jolly, and Mitchell 573(Kennedy, Redcay, & Courchesne, 2006), should be less
likely to commit the fundamental attribution error. Al-
though Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) individuals can
successfully infer traits from behavior (Ramachandran,
Mitchell, & Ropar, 2009), the possibility that neurotypicals
spontaneously do this more often than ASD individuals
awaits further investigation. Second, using techniques
gainedfromreal-timefMRIwhereonecanmeasureongoing
activity levels in circumscribed brain regions (deCharms
et al., 2004), it would be possible to create two conditions
by presenting the story segments during periods in which
t h ea c t i v i t yo ft h e s er e g i o n si sa l t e r n a t e l yh i g ha n dl o wa n d
to determine whether participants are more likely to com-
mit the fundamental attribution error when naturally fluc-
tuating activity in these regions is high. This result would
provide converging evidence for the hypothesis that high
resting activity in the default mode network leads to the
unwarranted inference of dispositions.
An alternative possible explanation is that activation in
the default mode regions more generally (and specifically
in the context of our task) reflects the default mode net-
workʼs role in abstraction and in taking a more distal per-
spective. Support for this idea comes from a study showing
that higher construal (i.e., more abstract processing) of
both social and nonsocial items produced activation in
dmPFC (Baetens, Ma, Steen, & Van Overwalle, in press).
Although in our study the dispositional answers certainly
require greater abstraction than our situational answers
(e.g., “Daniel returns the money because he is honest”
vs. “…because other people were watching him”), two
facts caution against this interpretation. First, that medial
prefrontal cortical activations predict later dispositional
responses before the response options are presented sug-
gests that the specific process of abstraction encouraged
by choosing among the alternative answers is not respon-
sible for the observed activations. Second, recent data
from our laboratory (Tamir & Mitchell, 2011) argue just
the opposite interpretation. In that article, default mode
network regions (including MPFC) were more active in a
series of proximal versus distal judgments in a number
of different domains (spatial, temporal, social, and hy-
pothetical [self vs. a hypothetical self]). These results
argue against the interpretation that greater default mode
network activation might simply reflect greater abstraction
or processing of a distant perspective and are contrasted
with the Baetenset al. (in press) findinginthat theymanip-
ulate distance as opposed to simply the level of construal
(or level of processing) required for task completion.
Other regions differentiated dispositional from situa-
tional attributions, but only when we collapsed across all
stories and across both story and answer phases. These
regions included the precuneus, TPJ, anterior insula,
and right inferior frontal gyrus. Although each of these
regions has been implicated in social cognition research
(Van Overwalle, 2009; Adolphs, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher,
2003; Fletcher et al., 1995), their involvement in the cur-
rent study was nevertheless not predictive of later dis-
positional attributions. Thus, spontaneous activation of
the MPFC, ACC, and lateral temporal cortices may be
indicative of spontaneous mental state representation,
whereas activation in the larger social brain network may
be indicative of more direct representation of mental
states. These findings fit nicely with findings from the lit-
erature on trait inferences, in which core mentalizing
regions are recruited during both spontaneous and inten-
tional trait inferences, whereas extended mentalizing
regions are recruited only during intentional trait infer-
ences (Ma et al., 2010). The sole difference between find-
ings is that the TPJ was recruited for spontaneous trait
inferences in Ma et al. (2010) but was not predictive of
dispositional inferences in the current findings. One pos-
sibility, albeit conjectural, is that the stimuli eliciting spon-
taneous trait inferences in Ma et al. (2010) may have
contained more information pertaining to temporary
goals or intentions (Van Overwalle, 2009), whereas this
was not the case for the ambiguous dispositional items
in the present work.
Other recent work from the same group (Kestemont,
Vandekerckhove, Ma, Van Hoeck, & Van Overwalle, 2013;
Ma, Vandekerckhove, Van Hoeck, & Van Overwalle, 2012)
has sought to distinguish between person and situation
attributions. In their work, Kestemont et al. observed
greater activation in mentalizing regions (e.g., MPFC and
TPJ) for both situational and person (dispositional) attribu-
tions relative to a nonsocial control. Although mentalizing
activations during situational attributions were not ob-
served in our data, a crucial difference between studies is
that we did not use a nonsocial control condition. To the
degree that situation attributions in Kestemont et al.ʼs
(2013) study contained person information, one would
expect greater activation in regions such as MPFC and
TPJ for a social (situation attributions) versus nonsocial
(semantic truth judgments) task.
Because participants regularly make situational attribu-
tions about their own behavior (Jones & Nisbett, 1971),
it is possible that taking anotherʼs perspective would lead
to greater consideration of the situational forces guiding
that personʼs behavior. MPFC has been regularly im-
plicated in taking the perspective of another individual
(DʼArgembeau et al., 2007), and so we might have ex-
pected this regionʼs involvement when participants made
situational rather than dispositional attributions. Because
this pattern did not emerge in the present data, we can be
somewhat confident that perspective-taking did not play
ap a r ti np a r t i c i p a n t s ʼ judgments, at least in the context
of the present stories. Future investigation could directly
manipulate participantsʼ requirements to take othersʼ per-
spective to understand the role of this cognitive process
in making attributions about peopleʼs behavior.
Rather than activations in MPFC for predicting situa-
tional attributions, we instead saw greater activation in a
single region in the left anterior temporal lobe (ATL) that
extended into the amygdala. Although a significant body
of work suggests a role for the ATL in social cognition in
574 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 26, Number 3general (Olson, Plotzker, & Ezzyat, 2007), its role appears
to be more circumscribed to the acquisition of social
semantic knowledge (Simmons, Reddish, Bellgowan, &
Martin, 2010) rather than in mental state representation.
A recent review suggests that this region is specialized
for the binding of complex perceptual inputs (like the
sights and sounds implied by our scenarios) to visceral
emotional responses (which fits withthe locusofactivation
in the amygdala observed here; Olson et al., 2007).
Although we did not have clear hypotheses about regions
predicting situational attributions, we do note that iden-
tical social information was present in both conditions,
thus suggesting that something about the activations in
the ATL and amygdala represent a cognitive process that
led participants to greater use of the situational explana-
tion in those trials. The possibility of these regions sig-
naling the salience of situational causes of behavior is an
intriguing one that awaits further investigation.
Finally, we note that both the “situational” and “disposi-
tional” options include information about the targetʼsi n -
tentions. Theorists in the attribution literature have long
noted the apparent misnomer of “situational causations”
in fact occurring because of the actorʼs mental state and
not because of the situation per se. Gilbert (1998) dis-
cusses behaviors that attract situational explanations (e.g.,
“He ran away because there was a snake.”)t h a ta r ei n
reality caused by “ordinary dispositions” (e.g., “Ir a na w a y
from the rattlesnake because I dislike being injected with
venom.”). These are contrasted with behaviors that occur
because of “extraordinary dispositions” (e.g., “He stayed to
tackle the rattlesnake because he is foolhardy” [Gilbert,
1998]). Trope (1989) similarly distinguishes between two
kinds of inference regarding dispositions; one leading to
behavior-specific causes (like Gilbertʼs “ordinary” disposi-
tions), and the other leading to general (or “extraordinary
dispositional”) causes. Along those lines, we aimed to dis-
tinguish between the responses available to participants
for our stories such that the “dispositional” answers we
made available were more distal, general, or truly disposi-
tional, whereas the “situational” answers, which never-
theless reflected actorsʼ intentions, were more proximal,
behavior-specific, and reflected normative responses to
the situational forces described in the stories. That being
said, we feel that the crucial analysis in this article (the
prediction of dispositional responses by dmPFC activation)
does not hinge upon whether or not the two answers
both involve the inference of intentions. We analyzed data
from the stories preceding the participantsʼ responses and
thus from the period before participants were aware of the
available dispositional and situational options for a given
story. This argues that the brain responses in dmPFC that
predict subsequent dispositional answers reflect sponta-
neous inferences of extraordinary traits and dispositions,
regardless of whether the dispositional and situational
answers both require the representation of mental states.
In conclusion, we suggest that mentalizing—the consid-
eration of othersʼ mental states—may be the very reason
we make errors in attribution. Our default tendency to
adopt the intentional stance, as characterized by recruit-
ment of the core social brain regions, seems a wonderfully
adaptive strategy that nevertheless comes with significant
costs: biasing our inferential ability in favor of dispositional
explanations that are not always warranted.
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